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On the Telos of Man and Law: An Essay
Concerning Morality and Positive Law
Among the laws which men make are some which deal with what is
good or bad by its very nature; and they require man to do right and
avoid wrong, and make their observance binding on pain of some
suitable penalty. But these laws do not owe their origin to civil society
by any means. Civil society did not create human nature and so cannot
be credited with being the author of the good which benefits the nature,
nor of the evil that harms it. Laws were in existence before ever men
formed themselves into a society; they come from natural law, which,
in its turn, is a reflection of the divine, eternal law.
Pope Leo XIII, Libertas preaestantissimum
The positivist philosopher grants to the State the sole power to promlugate
positive laws and thereby determine man's freedoms and liberties. Positiv-
ism, however, allows those in society with sufficient authority to enforce
their will to suppress individual freedom simply by enacting positive laws.
But mere positivism must be rejected as an inadequate philosophical reason
for law because positive mandates can be inherently unjust and deprive
persons of their natural rights. To preserve the justness of the law, the
State's edicts must be derived from a reasoned and informed understanding
of man's nature and the goal of human fulfillment.
Saint Thomas Aquinas stated that positive law is nothing other than "an
oidinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of
the community, and promulgated."' By stating that law is an "ordinance
of reason," Aquinas advanced the idea that the common good of the
community is rationally discernible to the human mind. In addition, Aquinas
b6nceived the common good of the community as a universal principle of
morality, because the term goodi even in its utilitarian sense, has moral
significance due to its inherent desirability. Aquinas thus linked a definition
of law as an ordinance of reason with the moral principle of the common
good.
The common good is an aggregate of the individual good of each member
of the community. In turn, the realization of individual good depends upon
achieving human fulfillment. Because human fulfillment is a tenant of the
natural law, it becomes a rational method of determining the morality of
law. Thus, from Aquinas' understanding, rational humans can judge the
justness of positive laws according to a criterion superior to mere positivism
by considering whether a given law frustrates human fulfillment. A law
which hinders human fulfillment would be unjust or immoral and, depending
1. T. AQux rs, I SummA THEOLOGICA, q. 90, art. 4, at 495 (Dominican Fathers' ed. 1947).
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on the severity of the injustice, should not bind the individual or society.
Starting with the proposition that man is a rational animal, Aquinas
defined law as an ordinance of reason. It is the faculty of reason that
separates man from the brute animals. However, reason itself is not empir-
ically verifiable since by its very nature it is not quantifiable. In consequence,
a skeptical materialist might challenge the assertion that man is a rational
animal and demand an intellectual argument to support the proposition.
Paradoxically, however, as Immanuel Kant recognized, the demand for
intellectual proof by itself demonstrates the point that man, sui generis, is
endowed with the faculty of reason. Kant stated succinctly that only a
rational being would seek to "[prove by] reason that there is no such thing
as reason.
'2
Given then that man has the use of the faculty of reason, how does man
acquire knowledge? David Hume expounded as a philosophical truth that
man could have knowledge only of that which is empirically verifiable. 3 For
Hume, knowledge is limited to observations about a specific event at a
particular moment in time. Under his theory, it is impermissible to abstract
or generalize from an event because the recurrence of the same or similar
event is unpredictable. In effect, Hume denied all causality.
However, the difficulty with Hume's proposition is the idea that all
knowledge is known empirically. Hume's own theory of empiricism is
unknowable since empiricism as an intellectual concept is itself not quan-
tifiable or observable. The very definition of empiricism negates it as an
intellectual principle and Hume's thesis is not so much erroneous as it is
absurd because, as an argument, it is self-referentially inconsistent. Aside
from its logical fallacy, the principle in practice would eliminate knowledge
worthy of the name. Eliminating the ability to abstract generalities from
particulars, a direct result of overthrowing knowledge of causalities, robs
man of scientific knowledge.4
2. H. Ai.Kus, FIRST THmNGs, AN INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST PRINcIPLES OF MORALs AND
JUSTICE 72 (1986).
The very posing of the challenge already presupposes the answer that the skeptics
are seeking to resist. And of course who else but a rational creature would
conceive of marshalling reasons at the highest level for the sake of resisting the
proposition that human beings are capable of marshalling and understanding
reasons?
Id. at 71-72.
3. D. Humm, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in IV THE PmtosoPmcAL
WORKS OF DAVID HutmE, sec. IV, pt. I, (1854) "[Knowledge is not] attained by reasonings a
priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are
constantly conjoined with each other." Id.
4. H. ARKus, supra note 2, at 63.
We think we see a ship draw its anchor and prepare to leave the harbor, and
later we see the ship moving out to sea. And yet we would not be warranted in
assuming that this order of events, as it appeared to our senses, was a product
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The preservation of knowledge gained by causality protects scientific
knowledge. Scientific knowledge allows one to know particular facts that
are universally true.5 A simple illustration of scientific knowledge is found
in geometric shapes. Every triangle will possess three sides. The same sort
of knowledge holds true for the interaction of physical properties; two
atoms of hydrogen and one atom of oxygen will universally produce water
given consistent conditions in temperature and pressure. The converse of
scientific knowledge is an individual occurrence which is not the member
of a species. 6
The requirement of empirical verification unduly restricts the original
-philosophical understanding of the term "science." Scientific knowledge is
the means by which man takes separated segments of knowledge and
attempts to "interrelate them, to grade them, and especially to explain them
in function of what he finds to be their causes." ' 7 We can know through
of anything more than our own subjective understanding. For all we strictly
know (on the premises of Hume's argument), the ship moving to sea might have
preceded the drawing of the anchor and the preparation of the ship for departure.
As silly as the prospect might be, Kant's point is that there would be no basis
for asserting anything to the contrary as a necessary truth if we admit Hume's
premise that what we know, we can know only on the strength of "experience."
Id. (emphasis in original).
5. J. OWENS, AN ELEMENTARY C13iSTIAN METAPInysics 236 (1986).
The universality and necessity under which intellection attains its object make
possible scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge has to be of the universal. It
requires, for instance, that what is known of a particular piece of sodium in an
experiment holds for all such pieces of sodium. It means that what is seen in
one individual can be applied to all individuals of the species.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
6. Id.
When in a Euclidean plane triangle the equality of the angles to two right angles
is demonstrated of an individual figure drawn on the board, it emerges as a truth
of universal applicability. On the other hand, if a merely individual occurrence
is considered without questions of any further applicability, it is not yet an object
of science. The fact is simply recorded, for instance that the Titanic sunk at 2:20
a.m., April 15, 1912. Only when it is considered under an aspect that can be
applied to other cases, for example that ships can be sunk by icebergs, does it
come under scientific consideration.
Id.
7. Id. at 17.
In this fashion the natural disposition toward metaphysical thinking was located
by Aristotle (Metaph., A 1-2, 980A22 ff.) within the general desire of men for
knowledge. Wonder, especially at things that happen in an unusual way, such as
the movements of marionettes, prompts the inquiry into the cause. Accordingly
wonder, as Plato (Tht., 155D) had noted, was the beginning of philosophy. For
Plato (Men., 97B-98A) knowledge through cause had meant knowledge according
to a common Idea that manifested the nature of the individual. Against that
background, universal knowledge of the particulars, and knowledge of a particular
in the light of its cause, were equated by the natural desire, in this setting, tended
toward not just a description of the "how," but toward a penetration into the
"why." Cf. Aristotle, Ph., II 7, 198a 14-21. Even today, according to the
1989]
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scientific knowledge certain physical truths and certain conceptual and
metaphysical truths. A crucial question is the extent of this knowledge.
A common responsory intoned by the pious adherents of the contemporary
"dogma" of relativism is that "there is no truth." Ironically, this assertion
in itself posits one absolute truth, that there is no truth. Such a proposition
violates the philosophical principle of non-contradiction. The principle states
that something cannot have being and not have being at the same time in
the same sense. More simply, the principle requires that a light is either on
or off, not both at the same time, From the contradiction in the statement
that "there is no truth," it becomes obvious that truth does in fact exist.
Unless these relativists are attempting to advance an idea of radical solops-
ism, they then must seek to deny truth in the context of morality.
The real question, then, is which truths are accessible to the human
mind? Aquinas defined truth as "the conformity of intellect and thing.
Hence, to know this conformity is to know the 'truth.""'s For Aquinas,
truth is objective and exists apart from the subjectivity of the individual
mind to which that individual mind must conform. Objectively true scientific
knowledge of metaphysical principles is attainable to the human mind.
Morality would certainly belong within this realm of metaphysical principles.
However, is morality also objectively knowable as true to the faculty of
reason and therefore classifiable as scientific knowledge?
Relativists invariably point to the manifold disagreements over matters
relating to the field of morality, such as the fact that various value systems
of different cultures or societies conflict with one another, in order to
demonstrate that no universally true morality exists. Such arguments are
replete with facile rhetoric and lack serious philosophical merit. A classroom
filled with thirty second graders, working a simple math problem, may
produce a plentitude of contradictory answers. Each child may subjectively
believe that his answer is correct, yet the teacher and the mathematician
will maintain that there is only one objectively correct answer. The students'
answer fails to conform to objective mathematical truth. Aquinas addressed
this aspect of truth when he wrote: "For we see that of themselves men
can be deceived and err. But in order to know the truth they have to be
taught by others." 9
ordinary use of language, scientific inquiry is regarded as causal at least in the
sense of asking the "why"; "But in the way in which the term 'why' is most
commonly used, science does explain why . . ." J. Hospers, "What is Expla-
nation?" in Essays in Conceptual Analysis, ed. Anthony Flew (London, 1956),
p. 117.
Id.
8. T. AQtmiAs, supra note 1, q. 16, art. 2, at 90. Aquinas posits that truth is the Verum
finis ipsius or that for which the intellect strives. Id. at 82, 3 ad im.
9. J. OwENs, supra note 5, at 265.
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How does one arrive at the point where one can state that morality can
be as objectively true as the proposition that a triangle has three sides, or
that two plus two equals four? The answer to this question must be gleaned
from a teleological examination of man. Determining human nature and its
relationship to morality is fundamental to whether a given law is just.
Our treatment of anything must depend, in the last resort, on what we
think it is: for instance, we treat people one way and cats another,
because our idea of what a man is and what a cat is. All out institutions-
family, school, trade unions, government, laws, customs, anything you
please-grew out of what those who made them thought a man was.' 0
The translation of Aristotle from Arabic in the Middle Ages stimulated
a great deal of inquiry into the nature of man. Aquinas is the exemplar
and pioneer of this inquiry as it relates to natural law. After Aquinas,
scholastic theologians and philosophers like Jesuit Francisco Suarez devel-
oped an essentially different paradigm from Aquinas' natural law theory."
This paradigm gained ascendancy as a theory in the seventeenth century
and has held sway into this century.' 2 Suarez's model was different in its
intellectual mechanics from Aquinas' theory. 3 Suarez and the later scholas-
tics were correct in their belief that man possesses the faculty of reason
and that he is endowed with a common nature.' 4
10. F. SHEED, SocmT & SAN=T 3 (1953).
11. Id. at 112. "For an account of the differences between Suarezian and Thomistic
theories: Germaine Grisez, 'The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the
Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2,' Natural Law Forum, 10 (1965), 168-201."
12. G. GRisEz, Tan WAY OF THE LoRD Jasus, Christian Moral Principles 104 (1983).
13. Id.
14. Id.
What is most characteristic of scholastic natural-law theory is its notion of the
objective moral norms. The basic moral standard is simply human nature as it
is given-given, of course, not to sense experience but to intellectual knowing.
Moral goodness or badness can be discerned merely by comparing the essential
patterns of possible human actions with the intelligible structure of human nature
considered both in its inner complexity (human persons are vegetative, sentient,
and rational in themselves) and in its extrinsic relationships (human persons are
creatures, fellow creatures, and rulers of lower creation in their essential rela-
tionships). When compared with human nature, actions are seen either to conform
or not to the requirements set by nature.
3. According to scholastic natural-law theory, knowing whether or not a
possible action conforms with human nature is a matter of making a comparison.
Thus, this judgment is a piece of theoretical knowledge and has the kind of
necessity enjoyed by a fundamental law of nature. When the action is compatible
with human nature, the judgment registers conformity; it registers nonconformity,
intrinsic evil, when the action is incompatible with human nature in any of its
essential aspects.
4. Of course, to become aware of one's obligations it is not enough to observe
the conformity or nonconformity between the action and one's nature. More
than this theoretical knowledge, one needs a basic requirement. According to the
theory, this can be expressed in various ways: Follow reason, Act in accord with
19891
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From these premises, the scholastic natural law argument was that certain
acts are in accord with, or opposed to, human nature. In order for man to
act in a rational way, the argument concluded, he ought to behave in
accordance with his nature. Operative in the argument is the use of the
term "is," as relating to human nature, and "ought," as relating to actions
in accordance with that nature. To mix "is" and "ought" is logically to
mix the proverbial apples and oranges. The problem is that it is logically
erroneous to proceed from "is" to "ought," since "ought" does not follow
"is. 1' 5 Consequently, where does this leave the question of objective mo-
rality and human nature?
If in dealing with human nature we are precluded from going from "is"
to "ought," we are also prevented from going from "is" to "is" in the
field of morality. We cannot move from "is" to "is," because morality
deals with what ought to be and not with what "is." Germain Grisez,
professor of Christian ethics at Mount Saint Mary's College, advocates
moving from "ought" to "ought." His theory proposes that instead of
looking at human nature as it is, the focus should be directed to what
man's end ought to be, what Grisez terms "integral human fulfillment."
Integral human fulfillment is concerned with human goods. 6 The good
in human goods can be defined as the fullness of being. 7 Grisez presents
nature, or Do good and avoid evil. However formulated, the demand's full
meaning is grasped only when one sees it to be a message to the created subject
from God's sovereign will. And one sees nature itself ds an effective moral norm
only when one sees it as a sign of God's will.
Id. (emphasis in original).
15. Id. at 105.
But scholastic natural law theory must be rejected. It moves by a logically illicit
step-from human nature as a given reality, to what ought and ought not to be
chosen. Its proponents attempt to reinforce this move, from what ought to be,
by appealing to God's command. But for two reasons this fails to help matters.
First, unless there is a logically prior moral norm indicating that God's commands
are to be obeyed, any command of God considered by itself would merely be
another fact which tells us nothing about how we ought to respond. Second,
even leaving this problem aside, the difficulty remains that human persons are
unlike other natural entities; it is not human nature as a given, but possible
human fulfillment which must provide the intelligible norms for free choices.
Id.
16. Id. at 115.
As the preceding critique of scholastic natural-law theory suggests, a sound
account of normative existential principles must show how they are grounded in
human goods. If they are not so grounded, there is no adequate answer to the
question, "Why should I be morally good?" The answer is not that God
commands this, for the moral obligation to obey divine commands, although
rightly accepted by believers, is not self-evident. Indeed, nothing clarifies the
force of moral norms except the relationship of morality to human goods.
Id.
17. Id. at 118.
The fullness of being, the goodness of each creature, is that fullness of which it
[Vol. 64:965
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integral human fulfillment in such a way that it is constituted of seven,
incommensurable human goods. In an of themselves, the goods of integral
human fulfillment are not moral principles since "they do not directly tell
one which choices to make and which to avoid." '18 Rather, as already
mentioned, they are the goods to which humans strive.
The goods of integral human fulfillment are based on the dual aspect of
the human person: the existential and the substantive. 19 Man is both sentient
and intelligent; in common parlance he is a rational animal. There has been
a good deal of debate through the centuries -as to what constitutes man's
reaching fullness of being. Grisez has posited four existential categories and
three substantive categories. If an individual life includes a profound share
of these goods, he will lead a fulfilling life.
The existential goods have as a common element an idea of harmony
within oneself, including harmony among all the aspects of the person. The
individual has the harmony of inner peace (the good of integrity) and
harmony between the way he really is and the way he is perceived by others
(the good of authenticity). There is also harmony among persons (the good
of friendship or justice) and harmony between persons and God (the good
of religion). 2° Harmony does not just transpire; it must be attained. Indi-
viduals must engage in some form of activity, the result of which is harmony.
This is most clearly illustrated in the case of friendship. If two people are
prevented from ever talking to each other, seeing each other, or engaging
in any other form of activity, they will never become friends. These activities
are the three substantive goods, the substance through which the existential
goods come into being. There is the good that corresponds to the fact that
man is an animal (the good of life and health). There is a good that
is capable, insofar as it is a creature of a certain sort, with certain capacities
and opportunities to be and be more. A turtle is not defective inasmuch as it
lacks the ability to run like a gazelle, nor is an ape defective because it lacks a
sense of justice. Goodness is the fullness appropriate to each entity. Badness is
not simply lack, it is privation-lack of what ought to be.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 119.
By nature, human persons are both sentient and intelligent. Their sentient nature
is similar to that of other animals; their intelligence and freedom of choice are
distinctive. Emotions are aroused by sentient awareness of what is suited or
unsuited to the person as organism. Free choices are made on the basis of
judgments about what will fulfill or prevent the fulfillment of the person as a
whole.
3. Although complex, the acting person is one self. A person lives in a single
world, and behavior must be adapted to all aspects of the reality of this world.
Hence, normally a person's outward behavior is motivated at once by both
emotion and will, directed both toward sensible pleasure (or the avoidance of its
opposite) and intelligible fulfillment (or the avoidance of its privation).
Id.
20. Id. at 124.
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porresponds to the fact man is rational (the good of truth and appreciation
of beauty). Finally, there is the good that conforms to the fact that man
is a rational animal (the good of play and skilled performance). 21 All of
the goods are co-equal; thus, one cannot be juxtaposed against another in
order to conduct a balancing test.? Both the co-equal existential and
substantive goods are aspects of the person and do not possess reality apart
from the person.23 The g6ods in Grisez's theory are reflexive "since they
are both reasons for choosing and are in part defined in terms of choos-
ing."
What is immorality and how does it relate to this theory? Immorality is
anything which keeps an individual from reaching integral human fulfill-
ment. Challenging this point is senseless for who would suggest that man
should not live in harmony with his fellow man? When a man acts morally,
he acts in the way he ought to act, and he ought to act in the manner by
which he will reach integral human fulfillment. As stated before, the seven
goods of integral human fulfillment are not principles of morality but
personal principles which our nature strives to obtain. Morality is deduced
from the first principle of reason and what Grisez terms the first principle
of morality as well as his eight modes of responsibility.u
The first principle of reason is that "[tjhe good is to be done and pursued;
the bad is to be avoided. ' 26 This is a directive for action and not A
description of good and evil. Grisez points out that
when choices are made, the goodness of good is never 4irectly challenged.
In making life and death decisions, for instance, no one assumes that
life as such is bad and death good; choices to let die or even to kill are
instead made on other grounds, such as the limitation of suffering or
the justice of punishing criminals. Evidently, then, there is a need for
21. Id.
22. Id.
Religion is a great blessing, for nothing in life is more important than liberation
from sin and friendship with God. However, harmony with God should not be
confused with God himself nor with the divine life in which Christians share by
adoption. The human good of religion-that harmony with God which perfects
human persons as human-is only one human good alongside others . . .St.
Thomas Aquinas makes this point by distinguishing the virtue of religion from
the theological virtues [faith, hope, charity]. The former, concerned with specif-
ically religious acts, such as prayer and sacrifice, does not bear upon God himself
as the latter do ....
Id.
23. Id. at 121. "Property and other things extrinsic to persons can be valuable by being
useful to persons. But the basic goods by which they enjoy self-fulfillment must be aspects of
persons, not merely things they have .... " Id.
24. Id. at 124.
25. Id. at 189.
26. T. AQUINAS, supra note 1, q. 94, art. 2, at 1009.
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moral norms which will guide choices toward overall fulfillment in terms
of human goods.-
The first principle of morality, which is designed to guide choices toward
fulfillment in the human goods, can be formulated as follows: "In volun-
tarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one
ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose
willing is compatible with a will toward integral human fulfillment."'-8 The
first moral principle is enacted when a choice must be made, yet freedom
is maintained in that a person can act against its dictates. Alone, the first
principle of morality is too broad to provide precise answers to specific
moral questions. What Grisez calls the eight modes of responsibility stand
as a via media between the first principle of morality, and the direct choices
that confront the individual.29
Each of the eight modes of responsibility excludes a certain unreasonable
act of volition which would be contrary to the attainment of integral human
fulfillment. The first mode can be characterized by the statement: "One
should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for intelligible goods."1
30
This mode essentially dictates that laziness, depression, or lack of enthusiasm
should not prevent the individual from pursuing the goods that will lead to
integral human fulfillment. A distinction must be made between slothful
irnaction and an action not undertaken because it would be too taxing or
because a person needed rest. Inaction undertaken for reasons of this nature
do not violate the first mode of responsibility.
31
27. G. GmisEz, supra note 12, at 183.
St. Thomas holds that the precepts of charity (see Mt 22.37-39) are the primary
and general moral principles of natural law, and the Ten Commandments, which
he also thinks belong to natural law, follow from these primary precepts as
conclusions from principles (see S.t., 1-2, q. 100, a. 3, ad 1; cf, q. 98, a. 1; q.
99, a.1, ad 2; q. 99, aa. 2-3). As St. Paul points out, love fulfills the law because
one who loves certainly avoids harm to any neighbor and seeks the neighbor's
good (see Rom 13.8-10; 1 Thes 5.15).
Id.
28. Id. at 184.
.9. Id. at 189. "The mode of responsibility specify-'pin down'-the primary moral
principle by excluding as immoral a9tions which involve willing in certain specific ways
inconsistent with a will toward integral human fulfillment." Id.
30. Id. at 205.
31. Id. at 206.
Here is an example of the violation of this mode: Simply out of laziness, a man
sleeps past the time when he had decided to get up and so fails to do something
he had judged worth doing. Again: A woman in authority realizes that a particular
situation requires attention but somehow just doesn't get around to dealing with
it. The virtuous disposition corresponding to this mode has various aspects and
is usually named in reference to some particular sphere of action. Various aspects
are referred to by certain words like "ambitious," "energetic," "diligent,"
"industrious," and "enthusiastic." Words which name the opposed vice include
"lazy," "sluggish," "lackadaisical," "slothful," and "dilatory."
1989]
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That "one should not be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act
individualistically for intelligible goods," 32 is the second mode of responsi-
bility. The individual violates this mode when he acts on nonrational grounds
and fails to consider or dismisses the communitarian aspect of his acts.
"Unnecessary individualism is not consistent with a will toward integral
human fulfillment, which requires a fellowship of persons sharing in goods. 33
It is important to keep always in mind that integral human fulfillment is
not found in social Darwinism but in the realization of all of the human
goods in the totality of the human community. 34
The third mode deals with action motivated by desire, impulse, or habit.
"One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of
one's pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the
satisfaction of the desire itself."' 35 The end or goal of a choice which violates
this mode is not an intelligible good but the satisfaction of an emotional
desire; at the very least, the choice thus uselessly expends time and energy
which should be directed to the attainment of human goods.
Violators [of this mode] are not in control of their own lives but are
slaves to nonrational motives. Self-control includes at least some aspects
of many traditionally recognized virtues, such as temperance, modesty,
chastity, and simplicity of life. . . .The opposed vice includes at least
certain aspects of lustfulness, gluttony, greed, jealousy, envy, shortsight-
edness, impetuosity, and so on.3 6
When actions are undertaken based on a choice motivated by a desire to
fulfill some emotional satisfaction, the will is directed against integral human
fulfillment. 37
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 207.
Examples are often found in the tendency of a community's more active members
to appropriate functions to themselves instead of fostering wider, active partici-
pation, because the latter is more trouble and leads to uneven performance.
Again: A person with many interests easily becomes overcommitted; this will
lead to mediocre performance and to conflicts of responsibilities which eventually
will affect others adversely.
Id.
35. Id. at 208.
36. Id. at 209.
37. Id.
If a person chooses to engage in some sort of sexual behavior merely to experience
pleasure and still desire, this mode is violated. But it is not violated when a
married couple spontaneously take pleasure in marital intercourse. If they do not
hesitate and deliberate, it is because there is no reason why they should not
engage in intercourse. In their situation, it has an inherent intelligible significance,
for it expresses and celebrates the larger, intelligible good to which they are
committed-namely, their marriage itself as a special sort of friendship. Loving
marital intercourse contributes to faithful communion in this relationship, which
is structured in a way that integrates sexual behavior in the service of life and
[Vol. 64:965
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Moreover, choices based on emotion violate the fourth mode of respon-
sibility. The directive of this mode is that "[o]ne should not choose to act
out of an emotional aversion except as part of one's avoidance of some
intelligible evil [which is the privation of good] other than the inner tension
experienced in enduring that aversion." 3 In this mode the individual's
choice yields to an emotional repugnance not founded upon an intelligible
evil. This situation is distinct from the morally acceptable practice of
spontaneously avoiding that which rationally should be avoided.39 Violations
of this mode occur when an individual abandons the duties of his vocational
state solely because of adverse feelings.
The fifth mode of responsibility deals with universality in the treatment
of individuals. Grisez elucidates the principle that "[o]ne should not, in
response to different feelings toward different persons, willingly proceed
with a preference for anyone unless the preference is required by intelligible
goods themselves."' 4° In violating this mode, choices made are not in totality
based on the achievement of human goods, but are instead motivated by
the feelings of partiality, which is advantageous to one or more but acts to
the detriment of the community. "Although partiality is often expressed as
selfishness, simple egoism is only one form. Possibly more common, and
certainly as unreasonable, is allowing one's choices to be shaped by personal
likes and dislikes, jealous love of one's own family, group prejudices,
culturally established patterns of bias, and so on."'41 The fifth mode's dictate
its transmission. This substantive good provides the vehicle for the reflexive good
of marital friendship, and so it helps distinguish authentic marital friendship
from its counterfeits, and love giving marital intercourse from the use of the
marital relationship for self-gratification.
Id.
38. Id. at 210.
39. Id. at 211.
The soldier who chooses to leave his post to avoid being killed does not violate
this mode of responsibility. His choice is not merely to escape fear itself. Rather
he seeks to escape the fearful and intelligible evil of death. His choice can be
morally wrong-for example, because the call of duty is a genuine one. Or the
choice to flee can be morally right-for example, because he is ordered unrea-
sonably to stand and fight by a leader who realizes defeat is inevitable but wants
his army to fight to the death.
Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 212.
Here are some examples of violations. Somebody accepts favors but always finds
excuses when asked to do them. People resent gossip about themselves and their
loved ones but gossip freely about others. Professional people give better treatment
to more respectable and congenial clients than to others with similar needs and
claims to their service. Lawmakers favor powerful interest groups which support
them, rather than working for the laws and policies they think best for the people
as a whole.
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of impartiality does not include the denial of special commitments that one
owes to one's family or other individuals.
In the sixth mode of responsibility, the triumph of form over substance
is considered. This mode states that "[o]ne should not choose on the basis
of emotions which bear upon empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or
bads) in a way which interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or
avoidance of the bad.' '42 Stated differently, individuals should not allow
emotional choices to limit their participation in intelligible goods or the
converse. Choices in violation of this mode are acts of self-deception with
deleterious ramifications on the individual's concept of the intelligible goods.
It is also immoral because people who allow their choices to be framed by
such emotions fail to move toward integral human fulfillment. People who
make such choices limit their participation in this portion of reality to mere
appearance. 43
The seventh mode of responsibility concerns the malignant volitional
destruction of an intelligible human good. Grisez relates that "[o]ne should
not be moved by hostility to freely accept or choose the destruction,
damaging, or impeding of any intelligible human good." 44 When an indi-
vidual acts on negative feelings, he embarks on a course contrary to human
fulfillment by irrationally seeking to reduce human fulfillment .4  Two acts
which are similar yet distinct need to be considered. If an action is motivated
by a hatred for evil, and the act and the reason behind the act are to
protect a good or limit an evil, then the act is morally permissible. 46 The
other permissible case is the release of hostile feelings through means that
are not destructive of human goods. 47
The eighth mode excludes balancing among the various intelligible goods.
"One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an
42. Id. at 214.
43. Id.
Here are some examples of violations. A sick man who could have treatment
which would really cure his condition prefers less effective treatment which offers
a feeling of quick relief. A girl engaged to be married spends all her time and
energy planning her wedding and has none left for adequate spiritual preparation
for married life. A bishop, anxious to reconcile those alienated from the Church,
holds penitential services to which he invites persons unwilling to amend their
lives, gives all who come general absolution without individual confession, and
thus fosters an appearance of reconciliation as a substitute for the reality.
Id.
44. Id. at 215.
45. Id. at 216. Several examples are:
A nation which is losing a war launches all its nuclear weapons against its enemies
to make their victory as costly as possible. Children who have been outvoted in
planning a party stay away in order to detract from the joy of the event. A wife
who resents her husband's infidelity has an affair to get even.
Id.
46. Id. at 215.
47. Id.
[Vol. 64:965
POSITIVE LAW
intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede
some other instance of an intelligible good."' ' This mode is the refutation
of the phrase that the end justifies the means. The violation of the eighth
mode occurs when a choice is made to act against an intelligible human
good in order to prevent an evil or to secure some other human good. The
impetus behind the choice is the strength of the various desires present to
the individual. "Thus one subordinates some possible elements of human
fulfillment to others, even though there is no reasonable basis for doing
so. In placing a nonrational limit on fulfillment, one proceeds in a way not
consistent with a will toward integral human fulfillment." ' 49 The eighth mode
should not be confused with a permissible choice for a human good the
execution of which will incidentally result in a human evil, even though the
probability of the evil was foreseen. It is also acceptable to subordinate
freely nonhuman goods to human goods. 0
The desire for integral human fulfillment is inherent to each individual,
but it is not actuated by egoism; it is, rather, realized in the community.
Integral human fulfillment, the first principle of reason, the first principal
of morality, and the modes of responsibility are accessible to the human
intellect through the faculty of reason because they are universal truths of
human nature.." When considered in totality, they are self-evident truths,
and their denial would be an act of irrationality. In Grisez's thought, these
48. Id. at 216.
49. Id. at 216-17.
50. Id. at 217.
This mode of responsibility is not violated by one who freely accepts death rather
than leave an important duty unfulfilled. Nor is it violated by killing animals
for food, since animals' lives are not instances of a human good. Nor is there a
violation in setting aside the letter of legal requirements for the sake of fairness,
since law is simply a means to this human good. Violations are present in the
following. To obtain a grant to continue his research, a scientist falsifies data to
make the project's initial results appear more promising than they are. To obtain
information which will save many lives, a military commander tortures children.
To bring about what he considers a necessary change in moral teaching, a
theologian encourages people to do something they believe wrong.
Id.
51. Id. at 196.
Apart from faith, humankind cannot know that integral human fulfillment is
possible, and faith teaches that this possibility can be realized only by the divine
act of re-creating all things in Jesus (see Eph 1.3-10; Col 1.15-20). However,
reason does not exclude the possibility of integral human fulfillment, and a
generous and reasonable love of human goods will lead one to act in a way
compatible with this ideal. In so acting, some degree (and a concretely expanding
degree) of human sharing in goods will be achieved and openness to integral
fulfillment will be maintained; at tle same time, unnecessary self-limitation will
be avoided.
Id. at 185-86.
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principles constituted a constituent part of what has been classically referred
to as natural law.5
2
The concept of natural law as understood by Aquinas begins with the
Eternal law, which is the mind of God. 3 Just as an architect has a blueprint
for a building he has designed, so also the Uncaused Cause has a blueprint
for the ordering of creation He has brought into existence ex nihilo. Aquinas
states in his Treatise on Law:
[A] law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from
the ruler who governs a perfect community [this is an Aristotelian
concept; the banding together of human beings into a polity was
considered to be the highest form of community]. Now it is evident,
granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence. . . . that the
whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Where-
fore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the
universe, has the nature of law. And since the Divine Reason's concep-
tion of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov.
viii. 23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.14
To continue with the analogy, the architect has designed the building to
function in a certain manner. Hence, he has probably not designed, pur-
posefully, a building that has collapsing walls or is likely to fall over. The
same can be said for Aquinas' view of natural law. He states that the
light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is
evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an
imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural
law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal
law. 5
In keeping with our analogy, human beings can be likened to the walls in
a building; they are designed to function in a certain fashion, thus bringing
about the good or the fullness of being. This certain fashion in which
humans are to function is what Grisez has termed integral human fulfillment.
52, Id. at 329.
Likewise, any emphasis on law is likely to be confusing. "Law" has a bad name,
for it is much abused as an instrument of formal social control and an enforcer
of conventional norms, regardless of whether they have a moral foundation.
Hence, the aspect in which law is an alien imposition upon one's freedom is
paramount in most people's thought. Moreover, small children necessarily view
morality in a rather legalistic way, and adolescents inevitably rebel against this
childish view. Today, such rebellion is in full flower, with the whole culture
selectively setting law aside as an encumbrance of childhood.
For these reasons, I do not speak of "natural law," but rather of human
modes of responsibility, human moral principles, and so on.
Id.
53. The scope of the note prevents a recapitulation of Aquinas' proofs for the existence
of God, See generally T. AQuiNAs, supra note 1, at X.
54. T. AQuniAs, TREATIsE ON LAw 12-13 (Gateway ed. 1964).
55. Id. at 15-16.
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The postlapsarian human condition has brought into play the first princip
of morality and the modes of responsibility.
Positive law is law that is posited or placed by man. "[1]t belongs to th
notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state."'
The common good for both Aquinas and Aristotle was the leading of mai
to virtue, or the fullness of being, as Grisez would say.5 7 An unjust or ba(
law would not lead the individual or the community to the attainment o
the common good. Aristotle, in his Politica states:
For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated
from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the
more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be
used by intelligence and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends.
Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most
savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice
is the bond of men in states, for administration of justice, which is the
determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political
society.- s
Just laws advance the common good, or integral human fulfillment, which
is living in accord with natural law.
What course should be followed when a law runs contrary to the common
good or, to put it in Aristotelian terms, is unjust and thus runs counter to
the principle of an ordered political society? Aquinas states that "what
pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human government ..
56. Id. at 85.
57. Id. at 74-75.
[Mlan has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be
acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that man
is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain
beginnings of these he has from nature, viz., his reason and his hands; but he
has not the full compliment, as other animals have, to whom nature has given
sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice
for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists
chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is
inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained.
Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to
arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined
to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by
the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since
some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to
words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in
order that, at least, they might desist from evildoing, and leave others in peace,
and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to
do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now
this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline
of laws. Therefore, in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was
necessary for laws to be framed . ...
Id.
58. ARsToTnn, X THE Woaxs OF ARisToTLE, 1253a29-40 (W. D. Ross trans. 1921).
59. T. AQuiwAs, supra note 54, at 46.
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Since integral human fulfillment is the common good for which man
individually and collectively strives, a law which violates integral human
fulfillment or the modes of responsibility is ipso facto unjust. It is unjust
because humanly posited law is subservient to, and derives its purpose from,
integral human fulfillment.
As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i. 5), that which is not just seems to
be no law at all: wherefore the force of law depends on the extent of
its justice. . . Consequently every human law has just so much of the
nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any
point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a
perversion of law.6
By way of illustration the Final Solution and abortion provide a case study
of unjust legal situations.
The Final Solution in Nazi Germany and Roe v. Wades' in the United
States both violate the eighth mode of responsibility which embraces the
substantive human good of life in and of itself.6 2 Intertwined with the good
of life in both of these situations is the concept of legal positivismL The
concept of legal positivism was cogently set forth by Thomas Hobbes in
his work, Leviathan.63 For Hobbes there are no natural rights or law as
understood by Aquinas. Hobbes instead understands natural rights to be
those rights that man possessed in the state of nature, which essentially
devolves down to the simple axiom that a man could do whatever he had
the power to do. The State, which arises from the state of nature, in the
Hobbesian world is the dispenser of all rights. 4 With no connection between
law and morality, the State is free to promulgate any law or recognize any
right. Positivism as a legal philosophy reinforces the bulwark of the State's
power by holding its laws responsible to no superior criterion. Pope Pius
XII pointed out five years after the collapse Of the Third Reich:
The mere fact that the legislative power has declared something of a
binding law within the state does not in and by itself make this a true
law or constitute a true rights. The mere fact is only a standard or
measure of rights and laws in the case of the sovereign author and ruler
of all rights, namely God. The indiscriminate and decisive application
of this measure to the human legislator, as though its laws were the
supreme standard of rights, is the error of legal positivism in the strict
technical sense of the term. It is an error which lies at the base of state
60. Id. at 78 (emphasis in original).
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. It cannot be denied that today numerous individuals posit that human life is not of
intrinsic value, but is only of instrumental value. For a philosophical refutation of the
instrumental value of life, see G. GiusEz AND J. BOYLE, LE AND DEaTH Wrrm LBERTY Am)
JusTica, 372-80 (1979). Readers who also are interested in a theological refutation of the
instrumentalist theory of the value of life should see G. Giusaz, supra note 12, at 137-38.
63. T. HoBBEs, LEvAmAN, (C.Wilson & R. McCellum eds. 1960).
64. Id. at ch. 14.
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absolutism, and it amounts to the deification of the state itself.61
Under the ambit of legal positivism, as pioneered by Hobbes, there exists
no cogent method of criticizing the legal acts of Nazi Germany or preventing
such acts from transpiring in the future, save an illusory hope that humanity
has learned its lesson.
The State is not limited to participating actively in unjust legal acts; it
may also sanction the unjust acts of its citizens by stamping them with the
imprimatur of the state. Regarding abortion, advocates of natural law must
ask as an initial matter what is the value of human life, and whether the
fetus is a human life. The proponent of natural law must first decide
whether life is an instrumental or an intrinsic good. The instrumentalist
position considers life of value because it is used to attain a real good. This
position presupposes a duality between the person and his body and is best
characterized by the debates concerning "quality of life." Life can also be
viewed as an intrinsic good inseparable from the person. In analyzing the
two respective positions, Grisez concludes:
The dualist wants a distinction between person and life in order to treat
life as merely instrumental, wants to treat life as merely instrumental to
justify subordinating it as mere means to "higher" and "personal"
values, wants to subordinate life to protect the person's dignity, but
conceives of the person in a fashion that makes what befalls the organism
irrelevant to dignity. We conclude, therefore, that dualism is indefensible.
It is a theory which is at war with the experience all persons have of
themselves as unified wholes, as unified self-actualizing entities, whose
potentialities are given but whose flourishing is a unique challenge, and
whose life pervades and includes both. And since dualism is false, so is
the instrumentalist conception of human life which implies dualism."
If instrumentalism is rejected, and if the fetus is a human life, then
abortion violates the eighth mode of responsibility. Some individuals assert
that abortion does not violate the eighth mode because there is no proof
that the fetus is a human life. However, this assertion is philosophically
ludicrous because it attempts to place arbitrary lines in a linear biological
process.67
65. A. BYRNE, GOD'S LAw AND MAN's LAW 16 (1979) (quoting address of Pius XII (Nov.
13, 1949)).
66. 0. GRISEZ AND J. BOYLE, supra note 62, at 379.
67. The following editorial from California Medicine highlights this point:
The process of eroding the old ethic and substituting the new has already begun.
It may be seen most clearly in changing attitudes toward human abortion. In
defiance of the long held Western ethic of intrinsic and equal value for every
human life regardless of its stage, condition, or status, abortion is becoming
acdepted by society as moral, right, and even necessary .... Since the old ethic
has not yet been fully displaced it has been necessary to separate the idea of
abortion from the idea of killing, which continues to be socially abhorrent. The
result has been a curious avoidance of the scientific fact, which everyone really
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The Final Solution and the decision in Roe v. Wade are unjust because
they flagrantly violate the eighth mode of responsibility, or put simply, the
good of life in and of itself as part of integral human fulfillment. They
both show the result of divorcing the legal system from natural law.
There are two distinct forms of unjust law, those that immediately violate
the general welfare, whether in actuality or application, and those that do
not.68 Aquinas gives this example of an immediately unjust law in applica-
tion:
For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law
that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public
welfare as a general rule: but, if it were to happen that the enemy are
in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be
a great loss to the city, if the gates were not open to them: and so in
that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the
law, in order to maintain the common weal ....
A law which is not immediately unjust does not require prompt direct
action. The method of opposing this second type of unjust law guards
against anarchy in that if the danger is not immediate, then the people are
to act through their duly constituted authorities.70 These dictates make sense
only if we recall that law is ordered to serve the common good. This
ordering can only occur if laws are judged against the higher principle of
integral human fulfillment or, as classically rendered, the natural law.
Positive laws should not violate natural law, yet we should not legislate
all that is contained within natural law. For example, being rude to a waiter
may be morally blameworthy under the human good of harmony, but to
proscribe rudeness would be preposterous. In the process of striving for
integral human fulfillment, man should be concerned only with those acts
or laws which seriously threaten integral human fulfillment. The purpose
of positive law is reactionary; it seeks to prevent egregious violations of
natural law and to provide an incomplete road map to human goods. Its
function is not, however, to guide all of the seemingly inconsequential
human acts toward integral human fulfillment; one cannot hope to achieve
intergral human fulfillment through coercion. The concept of liberty, or
being allowed to engage in activities leading to integral human fulfillment,
knows, that human life begins at conception and is continuous whether intra- or
extra-uterine until death. The very considerable semantic gymnastics which are
required to rationalize abortion as anything but taking a human life would be
ludicrous if they were not often put forth under socially impeccable auspices. It
is suggested that this schizophrenic sort of subterfuge is necessary because a new
ethic is being accepted the old one has not yet been rejected.
Id. at 403 (quoting Editorial: A New Ethic for Medicine and Society, 113 CAL. MEDICn;E 67-
68 (1970).
68. T. AQufrwAs, supra note 54, at 102-03.
69. Id. at 103.
70. Id. at 103-04.
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is of preeminent importance. Aquinas makes just this point when he states:
Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority
of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid
all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous
vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly
those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which
human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits
murder, theft and such like .7
Just laws need not be consubstantial with morality, yet neither may they
violate it.
WmLiAm N. RrLEY
71. Id. at 91-92.

